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NEW YORK TIMES RULE EXTENDED
TO CRIMINAL LIBEL
Defendant, a district attorney, issued a statement to the press accus-
ing eight parish judges of laziness, inefficiency in office, taking excessive
vacations, and hindering his enforcement of the state's vice laws.
Louisiana convicted defendant' of a violation of a Criminal Defama-
tion Statute,2 rejecting his argument that the statute violated the first
amendment guarantee of free speech. On appeal to the United States
Supreme Court, held: The first amendment is violated by a state
statute which permits punishment of (1) truthful criticism of public
officials, or (2) false statements about public officials made with ill
will, but without knowledge of the falsity or not in reckless disregard
of their truth or falsity. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
Examination of the history of criminal libel reveals a lack of con-
temporary justification for its retention. At common law, the function
of criminal libel was to punish speech which could injure the state by
causing breach of peace.' Because a true statement may cause a breach
of peace as well as a false statement, truth was no defense to criminal
libel prosecutions.' The United States Supreme Court has only once
considered a criminal libel statute prior to the principal case.' How-
ever, the recent landmark decision of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,6
held that a public official may recover civil damages "for a defamatory
falsehood relating to his official conduct" only if he "proves that the
statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that
' State v. Garrison, 244 La. 787, 154 So. 2d 400 (1963).2 LA. Rxv. STAT. §§ 14:47-49 (1951).
§ 47. Defamation is the malicious publication or expression in any manner, to
anyone other than the party defamed, of anything which tends:
(3) To injure any person .. .in his . . . business or occupation.
§ 48. Where a non-privileged defamatory publication or expression is false it is
presumed to be malicious unless a justifiable motive for making it is shown.
Where such a publication or expression is true, actual malice must be proved in
order to convict the offender.
§ 49. A qualified privilege exists and actual malice must be proved, regardless of
whether the publication is true or false... :(2) Where the publication or expression is a comment made in the reasonable
belief of its truth, upon,(a) The conduct of a person in respect to public affairs ....
3 Kelly, Criminal Libel and Free Speech, 6 KAN. L. REv. 295, 301 (1958).
4 Ibid.
5 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). The Court in Beauharnais restricted
itself to a consideration of the scope of the statute, which was classified as a group
defamation statute, and accepted unquestioningly the idea that criminal libel raised no
constitutional issues
6 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
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it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."7
The rationale of the New York Times rule as stated in the principal
case is that criticism of public officials is the "essence of self-govern-
ment."' The "self-government" rationale of the principal case pro-
vides a hitherto-missing basis for defining "public official" and "official
conduct."
In the principal case the Court reasoned that the historical justifi-
cation for criminal libel is no longer valid.' The Court balanced the
need for protection of society from breach of peace against the first
amendment guarantee of free expression, and concluded that a criminal
libel statute-to be constitutional under the first amendment-must
meet a "clear and present danger of" breach of peace test. No "clear
and present danger" test was written into the statute in the principal
case. Furthermore, the Louisiana Supreme Court did not apply this
test in construing the statute. Consequently, the statute was unconsti-
tutional on its face and as interpreted."0 The Court went on to consider
the fact that the conviction was based upon a libel of public officials,
and examined it in view of New York Times. The New York Times
rule was clarified by the Court in the principal case to require a bal-
ancing of the public interest in knowing the truth about its public
officials against the official's private interest in protection of reputa-
tion." The public interest in truth was found to be superior, and the
privilege to publish truth is absolute without regard to motivation.
However, the Court found that the private interest in protection of
reputation increased when the criticism was false, and the motives of
the speaker were defamatory. 2 Consequently, the Court found that
the private interest was superior to that of the public interest when the
information was false and the speaker knew of, or spoke in reckless
7 Id. at 279-80
8 379 U.S. at 75
0 "[U]nder modem conditions, when the rule of law is generally accepted as a sub-
stitute for private physical measures, it can hardly be urged that the maintenance of
peace requires a criminal prosecution for private defamation ... " Id. at 69. (Quoting
Emmerson, Toward a General 77teory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L. J. 877, 924
(1963).
10 But Louisiana's rejection of the clear and present danger standard as irrelevant
to the application of its statute ... coupled with the absence of any limitation in
the statute itself to speech calculated to prevent breaches of the peace, leads us to
conclude that the Louisiana statute is not this sort of narrowly drawn statute.
379 U.S. at 70.
- [W]here the criticism is of public officials and their conduct of public business,
the interest in private reputation is overborne by the larger public interest, secured
by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth. Id. at 73.
12 The tenor of the Court's discussion was centered around castigation of the delib-
erate lie. Id. at 74-75. No other situation where the private interest would be clearly
superior was hypothecated.
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disregard of, its veracity.,3 Justices Black, Douglas, and Goldberg
argued in concurring opinions that the first amendment affords an
absolute privilege to criticize official conduct. Justice Douglas attacked
the major loophole in libel of public officials-the meaning of "reckless
disregard."'" He feared that a jury will be unable to apply the stand-
ard of "reckless disregard" in the specific and limited manner intended
by the majority," and that the application of criminal libel statutes
will not be successfully limited to specialized cases.' 6
The principal case poses anew the question, Who is a public official? 7
The solution must be applicable on both a horizontal and vertical plane.
Horizontally, the problem is whether figures from such areas as busi-
ness, labor, and entertainment are within the definition. For example,
is a baseball player 8 or newspaper columnist 9 a public official? Ver-
tically, the problem is whether lower-rank officials and employees are
within the definition; is a policeman" a public official?
Analysis of the Court's use of a conditional rule to protect criticism
of public officials suggests that the definition of a public official may
be found in the Court's rationale that criticism of public officials is the
essence of self-government. The significance of this rationale is that
the privilege should be applicable only when there exists a reason why
the public should know the information. Coupling this rationale with
the Court's recognition of the public-private distinction indicates that,
definitionally, a public official should be someone involved in the gov-
18 "Hence the knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless
disregard, do not enjoy constitutional protection." Id. at 75.
"4 "If 'reckless disregard of the truth' is the basis of seditious libel, that nebulous
standard could be easily met." Id. at 81.
.5 "Unless speech is so brigaded with overt acts of that kind there is nothing that
may be punished; and no semblance of such a case is made out here." Id. at 82.
16 "If malice is all that is needed, inferences from facts as found by the jury will
easily oblige." Id. at 81.
'. This question is particularly relevant because of the recent case of Baer v. Rosen-
blatt, 203 A.2d 773 (N.H. 1964), cert. granted, 380 U.S. 941 (1965), in which counsel
are directed to argue the question whether, at the time of respondent's employment as
supervisor of a county recreation area, he was a "public official."
1s E.g., Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 219, 250 N.Y.S2d 529 (Sup. Ct.
1964), in which the court refused to extend the New York Times decision to public
figures other than public officials.
19 E.g., Pearson v. Fairbanks Publishing Co., 33 U.S.L. WEEK 2307 (Alaska Super.
Ct., 4th Jud. Dist., Nov. 25, 1964), in which it was held that Drew Pearson was a
public official because the New York Times decision also applies to public criticizers.
20 E.g., Tucker v. Kilgore, 388 S.W.2d 112 (Ky. 1965). The court refused to apply
New York Times because the defamatory statements were not directed at the police-
man's official conduct as a policeman, but at his fitness and character as a man. The
court stated: "The freedom of 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' debate on public
issues guaranteed by the 1st Amendment cannot sensibly be turned into an open season
to shoot down the good name of any man who happens to be a public servant." Id.
at 116.
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erning process. 1 Self-government would not be advanced by expand-
ing the term to include non-governmental public figures.
The "vertical" problem of deciding which lower-rank officials and
employees within government are public officials may also be answered
by application of the Court's rationale. A person's job title should not
be determinative of whether he is a public official but rather the degree
of his involvement in the governing process. As the involvement of a
person in the governing process increases so also does his effect upon
self-government increase, in turn increasing the public interest in his
activities and the applicability of the Garrison privilege.
Two problems remain to be resolved. One is posed by the involve-
ment in the governing process of private figures such as lobbyists and
newspaper reporters. The rationale behind the proposed rule will fre-
quently require that such private figures be treated as public officials. 2
The second problem is posed by individuals on government payrolls
who are not part of the governing process, e.g., football coach at a
state-supported university" or the supervisor of a county recreation
area." State courts have evolved immunity tests25 in the analogous
area of torts by public employees which might be applied to solve the
problem of which government employees are public officials. 6 Dean
Prosser considers these tests to be cumbersome and unworkable.2 7
They are equally unsatisfactory in the context of the rationale of the
principal case, that criticism of public officials is the essence of self-
2 1 Blit see Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel: The Modem
Revised Translation, 49 CoIUEm, L.Q. 581, 592 (1964), where the author argues that
the first amendment should protect discussion on all matters involving some degree of
"public participation." This proposal seems to suffer from undue generality, and ignores
the interests balanced by the Court in New York Times and Garrison.
22 This would justify the Alaska court's treatment of Drew Pearson as a "public
official.' See note 19 supra.2
3 Butts v-. Curtis Publishing Co., 242 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Ga. 1965), in which
a football coach was held not to be a public official. "To hold plaintiff, an employee of
the University Athletic Association, a public official would, in this Court's opinion, be
extending the 'public official' designation beyond that contemplated by .. . New York
Times Company v. Sullivan. ,.." Id. at 394.2
-
4 Baer v. Rosenblatt, 203 A2d 773 (N.H. 1964), cert. granted, 380 U.S. 941 (1965).
25 The majority rule is that public employees are liable for torts only where the act
is done maliciously, or for an improper purpose. PRossER, TORTS § 126, at 1016 (3d ed.
1964). See generally Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L.
Rsv. 263 (1937). The minority rule is that public employees are liable for torts
committed while acting in a ministerial capacity but not while acting in a discretionary
capacity. PRoSSR, supra at 1015.
21 Some states also have statutes which attempt to define public official. E.g., WASH.
REv. CODE § 42.22.020 (1961). In Butts v. Curtis Publishing Co., 242 F. Supp. 390 (N.D.
Ga. 1965), a similar Georgia statute was before the court but it was found that a foot-
ball coach was not within its scope. However, the court indicated that, if a football
coach had been within the statutory defintion of public official, New York Times would
have applied. Id. at 393-94.
27 PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 25, at 1015-19.
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government. The proposal that Barr v. Matteo,28 which granted abso-
lute immunity from defamation actions to all federal personnel acting
within the "outer perimeter" of their "line of duty," be used as the
definition of public officials is subject to the same criticism. Rather
than striving for definitional perfection (with its consequent rigidity),
the Court should simply define a "public official" as someone within
the governing process and leave the definition of "governing process"
to case-law development.
New York Times left the unanswered question of what constitutes
official conduct. The Louisiana Supreme Court found the defamation
in the principal case to be purely a private libel.29 In reversing, the
United States Supreme Court held that the statements of the district
attorney constituted criticism of the official conduct of the judges, and
that injury to private reputation was not relevant when the criticism
is directed toward official conduct. The Court indicated that few state-
ments would not bear in some way on one's official conduct: "... . any-
thing which might touch on an official's fitness for office is relevant. 3
The privilege thus protects far more than just discussion of "the official
conduct of public officials."
The Court's treatment in the principal case of what constitutes
official conduct is in accord with the rationale of the privilege. The
concern is with advancing self-government by encouraging free expres-
sion, which would not be promoted by a rigid definition of official
conduct. The effect of this approach awaits development. Problems
of official conduct should be resolved by considering the position of the
person who is the object of the criticism, and the relationship of the
criticized conduct to his fitness for that position.
28 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
29 State v. Garrison, 244 La. 787, 834-35, 154 So. 2d 400, 417-18 (1963).
30 379 U.S. at 77.
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